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TORT

LAW-WRONGFUL

WRONGFUL BIRTH TORT

BIRTH-ExPANDING

DAMAGES

IN

ACTIONs-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,

404 A.2d 8 (1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty-eight year old Shirley Berman was under the care of
Drs.. Ronald Allan and Michael Attardi during her pregnancy
in 1974. 1 Medical studies show that women have a significantly
greater chance of bearing a child with Down's syndrome (mongo
lism) when they are over thirty-five years old. 2 Berman's doctors
never informed her of this grave risk. They also did not apprise her
of amniocentesis which is a procedure that involves the insertion of
a long needle into the mother's uterus to withdraw a sample of am
niotic fluid. This fluid is then analyzed; and the sex of the fetus, in
addition to the existence of any genetic defects such as Down's
syndrome, can. be determined. 3 This procedure is highly reliable in
predicting genetic defects with little risk to the mother or fetus. 4
In 1974, Berman gave birth to a daughter, Sharon, who was
affiicted with Down's syndrome. 5 The Bermans, previously excited
about the prospects of raising a normal, healthy child, were pre
pared neither emotionally nor financially to rear a mongoloid child.
They maintained that had they been informed of the high prob
ability of bearing a mongoloid child and the availability of
amniocentesis, Mrs. Berman would have undergone such testing. 6
If the results of the amniocentesis had revealed a fetus affiicted
with Down's syndrome, the Bermans contended that they would
have aborted the child. 7
The Bermans sued the doctors for malpractice in connection
with the birth of their mongoloid daughter. They brought a w~ong
ful birth action for damages they suffered due to Sharon's birth. 8 In
Berman v. Allan,9 they alleged that the doctors were negligent for
L Berman v. Allan, SO N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
2. Lappe, Can Eugenic Policy Be Just?, in THE PREVENTION OF GENETIC DIS
EASE AND MENTAL RETARDATION 456,462 (A. Milunsky ed. 1975).
3. Berman v. Allan, SO N.J. 421, 424, 404 A.2d S, 10 (1979).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
7. Id.
S. Id. at 423, 404 A.2d at 10. The Bermans also brought a wrongful life action
on behalf of Sharon which will not be discussed in this casenote. The tort of wrong
ful life is brought by the parents on behalf of the child to recover damages the child
has suffered due to being born as opposed to not being born.
9. SO N.J. 421, 404 A.2d S (1979).
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not informing Mrs. Berman about the risks of bearing a child with
Down's syndrome, and for not informing her about the availability
of amniocentesis. 1o They also alleged that the doctors' negligence
was the proximate cause of her bearing Sharon since Mrs. Berman
was denied her right to decide knowingly whether or not to obtain
an abortion. Consequently, she was injured by the birth of a
daughter afflicted with mongolism. l l The parents sought damages
for raising and educating their child, Sharon, and compensation for
present and future mental and emotional anguish as a result of giv
ing birth to a mongoloid child. 12
The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctors.13
Its decision was based on Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 14 the only previ
ously decided wrongful birth case before the New Jersey Supreme
Court. In Gleitman, the supreme court held that wrongful birth
was not a legally valid claim for relief. The court stated that no
damages cognizable at law resulted if a doctor negligently pre
vented a mother from obtaining an abortion of a child subsequently
born with birth defects. The court also said that even if damages
were cognizable, recovery would be precluded because of the pub
lic policy against abortion. 1s
The Bermans appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Ap
pellate Division; but before the appeal was heard, it was directly
certified to the New Jersey Supreme Court on the supreme court's
own motion. 16 Since the trial court ruled for the doctors on a mo
tion for summary judgment, the supreme court accepted the Ber
mans' allegations as true for purposes of the appeal. 17
In a unanimous decision in Berman, the New Jersey Supreme
Court rejected its position in Gleitman and recognized wrongful
birth as a valid cause of action. 18 The Berman court remanded the
case with regard to the wrongful birth action with the finding that
only mental and emotional anguish damages were recoverable if
the Bermans' allegations could be proven. 19
In Berman, the court found that if the doctors were negligent
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

[d. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
[d. at 430-31,404 A.2d at 13.
[d. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
[d. at 425, 404 A.2d at 11.
49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967).
[d. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 11.
[d. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
[d. at 432,404 A.2d at 14.
[d. at 434,404 A.2d at 15.
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in not advising Berman of amniocentesis, then they had to be lia
ble for the consequences. Otherwise, a woman would have been
denied her constitutional right to choose an abortion without any
recourse against the doctors.20 The court found this result man
dated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade,21 which established a woman's constitutional right to obtain
an abortion. 22
The Berman court stated that if the doctors' negligence had in
fact denied the Bermans' right to abort the chil<l, and thereby to
reject a parental relationship with Sharon, then the parents had
suffered compensable mental and emotional anguish when they
learned that Sharon suffered from Down's syndrome. 23 The court
did not mention the general rule,24 followed in New Jersey,25 that
a physical injury must accompany a claim for mental or emotional
distress damages.
The court summarily dispensed with the claim for costs to
raise and to educate Sharon. The court contended that it would be
unfair to saddle the doctors with the tremendous expenses to raise
and to educate Sharon when the parents were going to retain all
the benefits of the birth of a child. These benefits, according to the
court, were the love and joy the Bermans would experience in rais
ing Sharon. 26
This casenote analyzes the damages recoverable in wrongful
birth actions. The focus is on the two types of damages sought in
Berman. First, the alleged damages to raise and to educate Sharon
are examined to show that a denial of these damages was improper.
Second, the allowance of damages for emotional and mental dis
tress are analyzed as a proper award. Finally, the potential conse
quences of awarding damages against negligent doctors are evalu
ated to show that any hardship on the doctors does not outweigh
the liberalization of damages in wrongful birth actions.
20. Id. at 432,404 A.2d at 14.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
23. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328-29 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d
1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), wherein plaintiff purchased an expensive sports car
that never worked properly. The repairs on the car amounted to $4,000. Plaintiff
brought suit to recover the $4,000 plus associated mental anguish damages. The
court said the mental anguish would be compensable provided an adequate showing
of a resulting physical injury was made.
26. 80 N.J. at 432,404 A.2d at 14.
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BACKGROUND

The New Jersey Supreme Court first considered wrongful
birth twelve years prior to Berman in Gleitman. In Gleitman, a
mother contracted German measles during pregnancy, and the
treating physician allegedly neglected to tell her that her child
could be born with birth defects as a result. 27 When the child was
born with sight, hearing and speech impairments, the mother
sought damages for emotional distress, and the father sought dam
ages for the costs of raising the child. 28 The parents alleged that if
the doctor had warned them of the possibility of having a child
with birth defects, they would have obtained an abortion. 29 The
court reasoned that the intangible benefits of parenthood had to be
weighed against the emotional and monetary damages suffered by
the parents to determine a compensatory award. The court ruled
that it was nearly impossible to weigh the love and joy of parent
hood; and, therefore, no damages were awardable. 30 The court
then balanced the right of the fetus to be born against the parents'
right to obtain an abortion, and thereby to avoid mental distress
and monetary damages. Relying on the authority of Gulliver's
Travels and Other Writings by Jonathan Swift, the court concluded
that even if damages could be ascertained, the preciousness of hu
man life outweighed any damages suffered by the parents. 31 Based
on this analysis, Gleitman determined that wrongful birth was not a
valid cause of action. 32
The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted the issue of
wrongful birth a second time in Berman. During the intervening
years between Gleitman and Berman, the United States Supreme
Court, in Roe, decided that a woman had a constitutional right to
obtain an abortion. 33 The court held that this right was within the
constitutional right of privacy; therefore, any state limitation or
regulation of it was unconstitutional absent compelling state in
terests. 34 Relying on Roe, the Berman court concluded that the ar
guments of Gleitman could no longer block recovery. 35

27. 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
28. Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
29. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
30. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693.
31. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
32. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
33. 410 U.S. at 113.
34. Id. at 155-56.
35. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
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The recognition of wrongful birth in Berman brings New Jer
sey within the majority of decisions that has allowed damages
in cases in which the negligence of the doctor has resulted in a de
nial of the right to obtain an abortion. 36 Although the majority of
decisions has allowed recovery, there is disagreement as to the
proper measure of damages. 37 New York state courts have dis
36. See Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (doctor performed amniocentesis and assured the parents that their child
would not be born with Tay-Sachs disease, the child was born with the disease, and
the court allowed damages for the medical expenses and the pain and suffering due
to the birth of the child); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (consolidation of two cases on appeal). In Becker the doctor
failed to warn of the possibility that an abnormal child could be born. [d. at 406, 386
N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. He also failed to tell the parents of the exist
ence of amniocentesis. [d. at 406,386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. As a result,
a retarded child was born and the parents sought recovery due to the doctor's negli
gence. [d. at 406, 386 N.E.2d 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In Park v. Chessin (the case
consolidated with Becker) the doctor negligently advised the parents to have a child
despite the chance of birth defects. [d. at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
897. In both cases the court permitted a cause of action for recovery of the costs of
caring for the child. [d. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03; Karl
sons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (doctor was negli
gent in not telling the parents of the possibility that their child could be deformed
or that amniocentesis could be used, a deformed child was born, a cause of action was
allowed to recover for the parents' pain, suffering, and mental anguish subject to an
offset for any benefits from raising the child); Ziemba v. Sterberg, 45 App. Div. 2d
230,357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (doctor was negligent in not telling the mother she
was pregnant before she could have had an abortion, and consequently a healthy
baby was born; the court established a cause of action if the doctor's negligence is
established as the proximate cause of the birth, the mother can recover costs of rais
ing the child, the costs of the birth, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium); Ja
cobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975) (doctor failed to diagnose the
mother's condition as rubella, and therefore, failed to warn that her disease could
cause birth defects, the child was born with birth defects, the court established a
cause of action if the mother would have obtained an abortion, and recovery could
be had for the amount necessary to treat and care for the physical impairment of the
child); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (doctor,
unaware of the pregnancy, failed to diagnose the mother's condition as rubella, the
court permitted a cause of action if the parents could prove the doctor was negligent,
they would have aborted the pregnancy and limited damages to the cost difference
between raising a normal child and their child who was born with birth defects). But
see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (doc
tor did not take a proper genealogical history and did not inform the parents of the
possibility that the child could be born with Tay-Sachs disease or of the availability
of tests to detect the disease in the fetus, the child died from Tay-Sachs and the par
ents sued for negligence seeking damages only for their mental and emotional dis
tress which the court held were not recoverable); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64
Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (doctor failed to diagnose pregnancy in time for
an abortion, a healthy child was born and the parents sought and were denied dam
ages equal to the costs of raising the child).
37. See note 36 supra.
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agreed among themselves about what the recovery should be, vary
ing from granting no damages to allowing the costs to raise and to
educate the child in addition to compensating for any mental dis
tress suffered by the parents.38 Although the most recent New
York Court of Appeals decision 39 denied mental distress damages,
it did not formally overrule prior cases that allowed these damages.
The decision in Berman to allow mental distress damages repre
sents a minority view. 40
The remedy that should be awarded in Berman can be analo
gized to the remedy granted in a line of cases involving the negli
gent performance of sterilizations and abortions resulting in the
birth of unwanted children. The majority of these cases has allowed
recovery, 41 but again, there is disagreement over what is the
38. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(care and treatment costs allowed); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,366 N.E.2d 64,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (no recovery allowed); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d
73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977) (pain and suffering and mental anguish compensa
ble); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974) (costs
to raise healthy child and pain and suffering).
39. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 40, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
40. See 'Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977)
(the only other case allowing recovery for mental distress).
41. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (doctor
performed a negligent abortion which resulted in the birth of a healthy baby, the
court held the mother could recover all damages flowing from the negligence under
ordinary tort principles and the doctor could prove an offset in accordance with miti
gation of damages requirements); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967) (a negligent sterilization resulted in the birth of an unwanted child,
the court held all damages that reasonably flowed from the negligence, including the
costs to raise the child, were recoverable); Anonymous v. Hosp., 35 Conn. Supp. 112,
398 A.2d 312 (1979) and Anonymous v. Hosp., 33 Conn. Supp. 112, 366 A.2d 204
(1976) (unsuccessful tubal ligation was performed and birth of an unplanned child
resulted, recovery was allowed for the costs of raising each child, but the defendant
doctor could argue the joys of having a child as mitigation of damages); Coleman v.
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975) (improperly performed tubal ligation re
sulted in the birth of a healthy child, the court permitted no damages for raising and
educating the child citing the benefits of parenthood and only permitted damages for
the cost of the tubal ligation, the cost of the pregnancy and the loss of the husband's
consortium during and immediately following the pregnancy, however no recovery
was allowed since the parents failed to meet their burden of proof); Bushman v.
Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978) (child was
born following a negligent vasectomy, damages were allowed for pain and suffering
of the mother during pregnancy, the cost of the vasectomy, the loss of consortium
and the medical expenses due to the pregnancy); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App.
545,265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (doctor failed to perform a tubal ligation and a child was
born, recovery was allowed for mental anguish, on a negligence theory, and the costs
to raise the child were allowed on a contract theory); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App.
240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (pharmacist misfilled an oral contraceptive prescription
and a healthy child was born, the court allowed damages, as balanced against the
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proper measure of damages. The recovery allowed has varied from
the costs of the negligent sterilization, the costs of pregnancy and
the loss of consortium to the husband,42 to the costs of raising the
child, .plus all other damages that reasonably flowed from the doc
.
tor's negligence. 43 ·

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Damages to Raise and to Educate

Cases such as Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic 44 and Troppi v.
Scarf45 indicate judicial reluctance to awarcldamages associated
with the birth of a child. Utilizing the same reasoning as Sherlock
and Troppi, the Berman court limited damages by weighing the
love and joy experienced as parents against the unexpected but
substantial economic and social burdens of rearing a mongoloid
child. 46 Although Berman does not explicitly refer to the source of
benefits of having a child, for the mother's lost wages, medical and hospital ex
penses, pain and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth and the costs to raise the
child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.w.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (negligent sterili
zation resulted in a healthy baby, damages were allowed for prenatal and postnatal
medical expenses, the mother's pain and suffering, loss of consortium and the costs
of rearing the child to the age of majority as offset by the value of the child's comfort
and society to the parents during their life expectancy); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136
N.}. Super. 369, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (negligent sterilization operation resulted in
birth of a healthy child, the court allowed recovery for the cost of the operation,
emotional distress and for the costs of raising the child, less the benefits of raising
the child); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977)
(child was born following a negligent tubal ligation, recovery was allowed only for
the cost of the unsuccessful operation and the pain and suffering associated with that
operation); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978)
(healthy baby was born as a result of negligent sterilization, the costs to raise the
unwanted, but healthy, child were recoverable along with the medical expenses and
the pain and suffering incident to the birth); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,
356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (an unsuccessful tubal ligation resulted in the birth of twins,
the court upheld a $450,000 award to the mother based on ordinary negligence
theory and an award of $12,500 to the husband for loss of consortium); Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (crippled child was born after an
unsuccessful vasectomy and abortion; parents could only recover past and future pe
cuniary expenses associated with the care and raising of the child). But see Terrel v.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1973) (doctor performed unsuccessful tubal ligation,
and as a result a healthy baby was born, the parents sued the doctor for negligence
seeking only damages to raise and educate the child; the court, relying on public pol
icy, held no recovery as a matter of law because the benefits of a healthy child out
weighed any damages).
42. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975).
43. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
44. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
45. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
46. 80 N.J. at 432,404 A.2d at 14.
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its weighing formula, the formula derives from the "benefits rule"
from the Restatement of TortS: 47 "Where the defendant's tortious
conduct has caused harm to· the plaintiff or to his property and in
so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the in
terest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is con
sidered in mitigation of damages, where it is equitable. 48
Although courts have explicitly used the benefits rule to limit
recovery,49 the California Court of Appeal, in Custodio v. Bauer, 50
was critical of its application. In Custodio, a negligently performed
sterilization resulted in the birth of a healthy child, and the court
allowed recovery of the costs to raise and to educate the child. The
court found that the joys of an unwanted child did not outweigh
the economic expenses. Consequently, the benefits rule was inap
plicable since economic costs to raise the unwanted child could de
tract from the other family members' share of the total family in
come. 51
The benefits rule has b~en improperly applied in wrongful
birth cases. A benefit conferred on the plaintiff by the defendant's
negligent conduct should only offset the defendant's liability if
there is a direct and recognizable benefit to the interest to be pro
tected. 52 In Berman, the constitutional right to choose an abortion
without interference was the right that was violated. The joys of
raising Sharon do not have any relationship to, nor' do they miti
gate, the denial of the Bermans' constitutional right. The minimiza
tion of damages in Berman by weighing the joys and benefits of
parenting against the concrete costs of rearing a child directly con
flicts with the underlying basis of tort law which is to compensate
the victim for damages he or she has suffered. 53 If the benefits of
47. Id. at 433,404 A.2d at 14. Berman relied on Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d
8 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1975), to support its balancing approach. Coleman specifically relied
on the benefits rule of torts in determining that the value of a newborn child out
weighs a claim for the expenses to raise and educate the child, 349 A.2d at 13-14;
See also Troppi v. Scarf, 311 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v.
Stillwater, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (benefits rule used to limit recovery).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
49. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 112, 366 A.2d 204 (1976);
Coleman v. Garrison, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1977).
50. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (benefits rule criticized).
51. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
52. Id.; Maben v. Rankin, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 P.2d 681 (1961).
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at §§ 2 & 7, at 7 & 28.
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having a child are allowed to be offset against the parents' mone
tary damages, then the parents are left with an economic and social
burden they did not want; and the doctor whose negligence caused
the parents' burden is left in a position of having to pay only a
portion of the damages his negligence caused. In some cases, the
benefits may be found to equal or to exceed the monetary damages
with the result that the doctor incurs no liability. Such a method of
determining damages does not compensate the parents for their in
juries.
A determination of the reasonable costs to raise Sharon can be
based on an estimation of the costs of shelter, food, and clothing
required to bring up a child. Costs for a minor child to attend pri
vate school54 and future expenses for college may also be recovera
ble in appropriate cases. 55 Determinations of the costs to raise a
child are routinely performed in child support cases, and the same
procedure could be utilized in wrongful birth cases. In Rivera v.
State , 56 which involved the birth of an unwanted child due to a
negligently performed sterilization, the court determined that the
economic costs to raise a child were routinely ascertainable. The
court said: "Such calculations are made by estate planners, insur
ance companies, and sometimes by private parties as incident to
support proceedings or matrimonial settlements. "57 Rather than
following rigid or mathematical formulations to establish costs, the
common practice in child support cases is to allow the trial judge
discretion to determine the value of these costs in accordance with
the economic level to which the family is accustomed. 58 This gen
eral practice is followed in child support cases in New Jersey
where the trial judge is given the discretion to determine what is
reasonable and just support on a case by case basis. 59 This same
routine practice could be utilized at the trial level in wrongful birth
cases.
54. Smith v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 475 (D. V.l. 1972) (a child support proceeding
in which the husband was required to pay the expenses for a minor child to attend a
private school).
55. Thaler v. Klein, 55 App. Div. 2d 606, 389 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. 1976) (a child
support proceeding in which it was found proper for the husband to pay the full
costs of college education for his two daughters).
56. See note 41 supra, 94 Misc. 2d 157,404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
57. Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
58. Phillips v. Phillips, 344 So. 2d 786, (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Ducote v.
Ducote, 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976); Mathews v. Mathews, 42 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 356
N.E.2d 1083 (1976).
59. Gordon v. Gordon, 147 N.J. Super. 585,371 A.2d 791 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977).
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In Berman, however, the cost of raising a normal child should
be offset against the costs of raising Sharon, who suffers from
Down's syndrome. Since the parents had desired to give birth to
and to raise a normal child, only the extra costs associated with
raising and caring for for a child born with birth defects should be
recoverable. Several courts have followed this reasoning. 60

Emotional and Mental Distress Damages
Berman found the emotional and mental distress suffered by
the Bermans as a result of giving birth to a mongoloid child to be
concrete damages that were compensable. 61 In making this deter
mination, the court never discussed, nor did it require, an accom
panying physical injury.
It is axiomatic in tort law that "[ w ]here the defendants' negli
gence causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying phys
ical injury or physical consequences, or any other independent ba
sis for tort liability, there is still general agreement that in the
ordinary case there can be no recovery. "62 The purpose of this rule
is to insure that the mental injury is real. 63 Nevertheless, if it can
clearly be established that serious mental distress can result with
out physical harm, and there is a sufficient guarantee that the al
leged mental distress is valid, then the lack of an accompanying
physical injury should not bar recovery.64 Berman falls within the
exception to the general rule since the birth of a monogoloid child
will cause the parents mental and emotional anguish. 65
The court did not discuss the Significance of its conclusion that
damages were being allowed for mental and emotional distress
without a requirement of an accompanying physical injury. The au
thorities cited in Berman to support the allowance of mental dis
tress damages all required a physical injury of some sort in addition
to the claimed mental or emotional distress. 66 Although the court
B.

60. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 66 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In both Jacobs and Dumer the doc
tor's negligence denied the mother an opportunity to obtain an abortion and a child
was born with birth defects. The courts found that public policy did not bar recovery
of the extra costs to raise these children and to treat their handicaps. .
61. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14.
62. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24. But see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72,441 P.2d 912 (1968) (the minority trend of allowing recovery of mental
distress damages without a showing of an accompanying physical injury).
63. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 329-30.
64. [d.
65. 80 N.J. at 438-39, 404 A.2d at 17-18 (Handler, J., concurring).
66. Zahorian v. Russell Pitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 309 A.2d 754
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deviated from this general rule with regard to recovery of mental
distress damages without ever alluding to it, the award was proper;
several courts have allowed similar recovery. 67
C.

The Consequences of a Liberalization of Damages

It is conceivable that a liberalization of damages recoverable in
wrongful birth suits will result in an explosion of litigation. 68 The
jurisdictions that currently allow wrongful birth actions, however,
have not had their courts jammed with litigation. 69 Even if the
floodgates were opened by allowing more substantial recovery, that
would not be a valid reason to restrict damages. "[T]he fear of an
expansion of litigation should not deter courts from granting relief
in meritorious cases; the proper remedy is an expansion of the ju
dicial machinery, not a decrease in the availability of justice. "70
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that wrongful birth actions
should not be singled out for a limitation of recovery.71 The court
(1973) (single, young woman after being denied an apartment rental due to her age
and marital status became extremely upset necessitating several visits to her doctor,
the court allowed her damages for her emotional upset in a suit claiming violation of
the woman's civil rights); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (plaintiff
sought damages resulting from fright when a car passed close to plaintiff and made
her fearful of being hit, the court allowed recovery in this case for bodily injury or
sickness proximately resulti'ng from the fright); Muniz v. United Hosps. Medical
Center Presbyterian Hosp., 153 N.J. Super. 79, 370 A.2d 76 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (parents suffered emotional and mental distress as a consequence of the
method used to tell the mother of the death of her baby and the failure to locate the
baby or confirm its death for three weeks, although unclear, this case seems to follow
the general rule that a physical injury must result from the emotional upset to allow
recovery); Lemaldi v. DeTomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d
1220 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). See also note 25 supra and accompanying text; W.
PROSSER, supra note 24, § 54, at 327-35. The general rule is that mental distress dam
ages are not recoverable alone. A physical injury must accompany the mental distress
so that it is clear that the mental distress claim is not fraudulent.
67. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Law
Div. 1975); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977).
See also text accompanying notes 36 & 41 supra.
68. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(court held that if allowance of recovery would open the floodgates, public policy al
lowed a denial of recovery).
69. Currently, of all the jurisdictions that allow wrongful birth actions, New
York has the most reported cases. To date only seven cases have been reported.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Karlsons
v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. 1977); Ziemba v. Sternberg,
45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. 1974); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510,
391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d
950 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1978).
70. Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,214 A.2d 12 (1965).
71. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).

844

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:833

said that the right to obtain an abortion has become a constitu
tionally guaranteed right; therefore, any attempt to limit damages
would be an infringement of this right. 72 This court, along with
others,73 has held that damages in a negligence action should not be
limited simply because the suit concerns the birth of a child.
Although these damages may result in a substantial burden on
a doctor whose negligence causes an unwanted birth, a doctor
should not be automatically immunized from the consequences of
his negligence. To limit the doctor's liability simply because recov
ery would be large is unfair since the alternative would be that the
innocent victims of the negligence then would have to bear sub
stantial costs. Additionally, if the doctor is held liable for his negli
gence, he will have an incentive to act in a nonnegligent manner. 74
The consequences of increased liability may directly affect the
expense and availability of certain medical services provided by
doctors. Doctors could refuse to perform amniocentesis or to give
prenatal advice. Rather than abandon this medical service, how
ever, the medical profession may be willing to pay increased mal
practice premiums and then to pass its increased costs to the
general public. If this occurred, the Berman court's concern for
overburdening the doctor 75 would not be valid since the public at
large would, in effect, absorb the liability. Although it might seem
unfair for the general public to subsidize medical negligence by an
increase in medical bills, it is more unjustifiable to saddle the inno
cent victims of the negligence with the substantial costs. Such po
tential consequences are still not adequate reasons to restrict re
covery when a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion
has been infringed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Berman decision brings New Jersey up-to-date by its rec
ognizing wrongful birth as a valid cause of action in tort. The deci
sion followed the pattern of other jurisdictions limiting recoverable
damages. Berman limited recovery by not recognizing monetary
damages for rearing a mongoloid child. Other jurisdictions have
limited damages by stating that the joys and benefits of parenthood
partially offset or, in some cases, outweigh any recovery.
72. Id. at 46,356 N.E.2d at 499.
73. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rivera
v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1978).
74. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1963); 80 N.J. at
436-37,404 A.2d at 16 (Handler, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
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The recognition by the United States Supreme Court of a
woman's constitutional right to an abortion clearly represents a
shift in public policy from prior opposition to abortion. Conse
quently, courts should not readily reduce compensatory damages in
wrongful birth actions simply because the birth of a child is in
volved. If a doctor negligently performs his job and damages re
sult, he should be fully liable. Otherwise, a doctor may not have
an adequate incentive to act in a non negligent manner.
The limitation of damages in Bennan is based on the benefits
rule of tort law. The court balanced the joys of parenthood against
the monetary costs of raising a mongoloid child. This application of
the benefits rule is improper since the interest protected in this
case, the right to choose an abortion, is not benefited by the doc
tors' negligence. Therefore, the extra monetary costs associated
with raising a mongoloid child should be recoverable. The costs of
raising a child are routinely determined in child support cases, and
a similar determination could be made in wrongful birth cases.
The allowance of mental and emotional distress damages in
Bennan was a proper award despite the failure to require an ac
companying physical injury. Generally, a physical injury is re
quired to validate the mental and emotional injury. In this case,
the alleged mental and emotional injury is recognizable and com
pensable; and therefore, validation is not required.
Increased damages in wrongful birth actions could result in
higher medical malpractice premiums which would be passed on to
the general public. Although this would mean higher medical costs
for everyone, this is preferable to burdening the innocent victims
of the doctor's negligence with the substantial economic costs of
raising an unwanted child.
Liberalized damages could potentially open the floodgates to
wrongful birth litigation although this has not happened in the ju
risdictions that have allowed these actions. Even if the floodgates
were opened, that is not a valid reason to deny recovery in merito
rious cases. Where a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion has been infringed by a doctor's negligence, there is a rec
ognizable injury which should be deterred and remedied.

Andrew Rodau

